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The printed Arabic media offer hardly any critical re-
view of the social and political settings in the Arab
world that may help to explain the emergence of vio-
lent Islamist groups. Standard newspaper articles
and comments on the postÐSeptember 11 events
vary from elaborations of the marked inconsisten-
cies in US foreign policies to the popular conspiracy
theories in which 'international Zionism' is blown up
to mythical proportions. A few intellectuals, howev-
er, opt for a more open and frank approach to the is-
sues involved, including some who had been accused
in the past of endorsing militant Islamism.
Arab Intellectuals,
Usama bin Laden
and the West
Just before the American-British retaliation
against Afghanistan, the Arab daily A l - H a y a t
published a series of articles on Usama bin
Laden and his A l - Q aci d a network. Based on
interviews and statements made by former
members of A l - Q aci d a, the author, Kamil at-
Tawil, a Lebanese journalist living in Lon-
don, offers an in-depth discussion of the de-
velopment of A l - Q aci d a in Afghanistan and
beyond from 1988 onwards. He explains
that the organization did not begin its fight
as a jihad against Western influence in the
Arab world, but rather as one against the
'unjust Arab rulers'; anti-Americanism was a
later consequence of the Second Gulf War.
Bin Laden's failure to establish an Islamist
network operating from the Gulf region,
specifically Saudi Arabia, led him to Af-
ghanistan in 1990, to the Sudan from 1991
to 1996, and then back to Afghanistan
where he remained until the September 11
a t t a c k s .
At-Tawil argues that the radicalization of
the A l - Q aci d a was the result of a new leader-
ship within the network, headed by two for-
mer members of the Egyptian Jihad Ð Ay-
man az-Zawahiri and Abu Hifs al-Misri. The
goals now included the expulsion of the US
troops from the Arab Peninsula and the lib-
eration of Jerusalem. The new direction
taken by the A l - Q aci d a network was illustrat-
ed by its official declaration of war against
the US in 1996, and the enactment of a
fatwa to legitimize the suicide-attacks
against the American and Israeli armies and
c i v i l i a n s .1
Unfortunately, the frankness of these A l -
Hayat articles is not representative of the
Arab press reporting on the September 11
attacks and their underlying causes. Readers
of Arab newspapers are either confronted
with articles which abound in stereotypes of
and ideological remarks on Islamism and
the relationship between the Arab world
and the West, usually accentuating the US
support of radical Islamist groups in the
1980s and 1990s and criticizing Western
policy regarding the Arab-Islamic world.
Other articles emphasize the peaceful na-
ture of Islam and the faultiness of the Hunt-
ington thesis. The internal and regional fac-
tors causing the emergence of radical Is-
lamist movements are rarely discussed. Crit-
icism of the West is so frequent and in such
obvious disregard of the context that one
may conclude that despite the prevailing
condemnation of the September 11 attacks,
there is an implicit justification. Bin Laden's
popularity among the Arab peoples is be-
lieved to stem from his willingness to deal
with significant problems (e.g. Palestine)
and his ability to teach the 'arrogant Ameri-
cans' a lesson.
The conspiracy
Conspiracy theories, of which there are
three basic patterns, comprise another com-
ponent of common argumentation. The first
asserts that American intelligence orches-
trated the September 11 attacks, with the
intention of justifying an already planned
attack on the Arab and Islamic u m m a. The
second claims that the Christian Occident
orchestrated the attacks to create a pretext
for cleansing the West from its Muslim resi-
dents. This theory is further supported by
the apparent smear campaigns against
Islam in parts of the Western media and by
the first legal steps taken against Islamist
groups in Europe. The third mostly appears
in Arab media and is based on the assump-
tion that the West is dominated by interna-
tional Zionism. It is claimed that the attacks
were carried out by Israeli intelligence in
order to justify the brutal behaviour of the
Israeli administration against Palestinians in
the occupied territories. To this effect, a ru-
mour circulated that all Jewish employees
of the World Trade Center were mysterious-
ly absent on September 11. This theory rep-
resents a return to the Arab public's most
frequently used explanation for any crisis
situation: 'it's the Jews' fault'. Whether it be
the spread of the HIV-virus in the Arab re-
gion (allegedly by female Israeli HIV-posi-
tive intelligence agents who consciously se-
duce Arab men in order to infect them), or
the poor cotton harvest in Egypt (due to
manipulated seeds given by the Israeli gov-
ernment), Israel is always the culprit.
A clear example of how these different
conspiracy theories are not mutually exclu-
sive, is demonstrated by Mustafa Mahmud
in the Egyptian daily A l - A h r a m ( N o v e m b e r
3). In his essay Mahmud accuses the West of
having been planning its crusade against
Islam already for several decades. The Sep-
tember 11 attacks which, according to Mah-
mud, were carried out by American groups,
served as justification for attacking the Is-
lamic u m m a. In his opinion, the increasing
brutality of the Israeli army against Pales-
tinians is not only an expression of the cur-
rent anti-Islamic attitude of the Jewish state,
but also proof of Israel's participation in the
attacks. In an apocalyptic manner, the war in
Afghanistan is claimed to be the final battle
between true Islam and the materialistic civ-
ilization of the West. Martyrdom will relieve
the Islamic community from its continual
anguish, and cause the definite downfall of
the West. This line of argumentation does
not only elucidate a radical Islamist inter-
pretation of 'the end of history'. It rather
completes the last circle of an Islamist varia-
tion of messianic thought, in which the
good and its hero (in this case Bin Laden) ul-
timately prevail.2
Critical thoughts
Although simplified and ambiguous expla-
nations are clearly predominant in the Arab
press, a small number of critical articles repre-
sent important, though not necessarily new,
ideas. For example, the Lebanese philosopher
Ridwan as-Sayyid links his defence of 'true
Islam' to a critique of radical Islamism. He con-
demns the simplified depiction of Islamic pol-
itics as merely an implementation of the shar-
ica and the readiness to use force as a means
of Islamizing contemporary Arab societies. He
also refuses to legitimize the terrorist attacks
as a response to the American foreign policy
of the last decades regarding the Middle
East.3
The significance of this rather marginal po-
sition lies in the fact that As-Sayyid is known
as a prominent representative of moderate Is-
lamism whose advocates have been previ-
ously accused of quietly supporting the use of
violence by radical religious movements. This
clear turning away from militant Islamism re-
flects the recent rediscovery of the moral and
peaceful roots of Islamism, as articulated by
the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood, Hassan al-Banna, in the 1920s and
1930s. The Tunisian thinker Abu Yacrib al-
Marzuqi asserts that this turn-away entails a
distancing from the politicization of Islam
once put forth by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb
(1906Ð1966).4
A number of secular thinkers and authors
are shifting their focus within the Arab debate
since September 11 and openly discuss inter-
nal and regional factors. For example, the
Lebanese sociologists Waddah Sharara and
Salim Nasar argue that the rise of radical Is-
lamism was not so much a product of anti-
Americanism, but of societal crises in the Arab
world where ruling elites used religion as an
instrument to divert attention from their poli-
cy failures and the deficient legitimacy of the
political system. Therefore, Arabs should real-
ize the implications of the lack of foundations
to support democracy in their own societies,
before unilaterally expecting the West to deal
with the consequences of Arab politics. Both
Sharara and Nasar condemn the use of the
Arab-Israeli conflict as sufficient justification
of religiously-motivated acts of violence
against the West. They both hold that Bin
Laden's motive is much less the liberation of
Palestine, than it is the establishment of a re-
gressive Islamic state within the Arab world,
in which universally accepted principles such
as human rights would bear no meaning.5
The personage of Usama bin Laden and its
current use in the Arab public sphere re-
ceived some critical review. The Egyptian po-
litical scientist Wahid cAbdulmajid interprets
the portrayal of Bin Laden's character in the
media as a reflection of modern Arab hero-
legends. His being depicted as a lonely war-
rior against the arrogant powers of the West-
ern world is analogous to the construction of
the character of Adham as-Sharqawi, a leg-
endary fighter against the British occupation
of Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century.
Additionally, Bin Laden's hiding in the deso-
late mountains of Afghanistan reminds one of
the prophet Muhammad, who hid in the cave
of Hira' when leaving Mecca for Medina. This
particular legendary aspect seems to have
been consciously adopted by the Al-Qacida,
as reflected by their self-portrayal in the
video-messages broadcasted following the
first retaliation strikes by the US. According to
cAbdulmajid, the emphasis on Bin Laden's
eloquent yet matter-of-fact style of speaking
fulfil a double function: firstly, elating him to
the position of sole representative of self-con-
fident Muslims and, secondly, transfiguring
the lacking realism contained in his political
objectives.6
Even though these critical ideas do not oc-
cupy a central position in the Arab media's re-
porting on the September 11 events and their
consequences, they bear great potential for
the future. The possible intellectual isolation
of radical Islamism, on the one hand, and the
public discussion of the normative underpin-
nings of modern Arab societies, on the other,
are significant departures from the dominant
discourse. It seems to be increasingly difficult
to explain crises in the Arab world by pointing
to the West as the cause of all harms, and thus
divert attention from our own failures. Ironi-
cally, this change might be a significant step
forward in the dialogue between the Orient
and the Occident. 
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